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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relationship between fee income and net interest margins of banks. We use 
a sample of banks in the US over the period 1986-2012, and combine the Panel VAR with the GMM 
method. We find that changes in fee income have no impact on changes in net interest margins. 
However, a decrease in net interest margins is followed by an increase in fee income in the 
subsequent year. This result is more pronounced for large banks after the passage of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, which increased banks’ ability to generate fee income. We conclude that 
large banks can increase their fee income to offset the decrease in net interest margins. 
Keywords: bank, fee income, net interest margins, Panel VAR, GMM 
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1. Introduction 
 
Banks have experienced a continuing decline in net interest margins and an increase in fee income for 
several decades. DeYoung and Rice (2004) found that, between 1980 and 2001, the ratio of fee 
income to total assets of US banks increased from 0.77% to 2.39%, and the ratio of fee income to 
total operating income increased from 20.31% to 42.20%.  
 
Because net interest margin is traditionally the most important source of profit for banks, many 
researchers believe that banks offset the reduction of margins by generating more fee income. Allen 
and Santomero (2001) argue that banks are forced to change their way of absorbing risk in order to 
survive in the increasingly competitive environment. In order to have a buffer, banks develop new 
services and products.  
 
Some researchers have different views; DeYoung and Rice (2004) first point out an interesting 
possibility, activities that generate fee income could co-exist with the traditional banking activities. 
They find that even though commercial banks in the US increasingly depend on fee income there is 
little relationship between fee income and deposit-taking or loan-making. Roger and Sinkey (1999) 
treat this phenomenon as a way of the changing nature in the banking industry. They argue that these 
changes provide banks with the opportunity to change the overall strategy, to count less on traditional 
activities and to absorb more risk. Ewijk and Arnold (2013) argue that this phenomenon is a result of 
the structural change from relationship-oriented model (ROM) to transaction-oriented model (TOM) 
in the banking industry. 
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Regarding the relationship between fee income and net interest margins of banks, we follow the work 
of William and Rajaguru (2013). They propose the following idea, stable long-term relationship 
between fee income and net interest margins means that the growing fee income is to offset the 
decrease in net interest margins. Alternatively, no such stable long-term relationship means that the 
growing fee income is not used to offset the decrease in net interest margins. This result could be 
seen as active self-transformation in the banking industry which could be a result of increasingly 
diverse needs from different consumer groups. 
 
The empirical method of William and Rajaguru (2013) is as follows. First, they specify a multivariate 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model with fixed effects. Secondly, they take the first difference in 
order to eliminate the fixed effects. Finally, they estimate the resulting first-difference equations 
using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) method. To gain further insight, William and 
Rajaguru divide banks in their sample into three categories (big four, other domestic banks, and 
foreign banks) and several sub-periods (1988-1992, 1993-2010, 1998-2002, and 2003-2010).  
 
William and Rajaguru find a negative relationship between the changes of net interest margins in the 
previous year (Δmargins_lagged) and the changes of fee income in the current year (Δfees). They 
conclude that a decrease in margins in the previous year is followed by an increase in fee income in 
the current year. They also find that the decrease in margins is larger than the increase in fees. Finally, 
they find that banks tend to have higher fee income before the shrinking of margins. 
 
Our paper differs from William and Rajaguru (2013) in several ways. One difference is that, while 
William and Rajaguru use a sample of Australian banks, we use a sample of US banks. Therefore, we 
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can compare our results with theirs. Another difference is that we divided the banks into two groups: 
small and large banks. Finally, we divided the whole sample period into two sub-periods based on the 
change of regulations in the US banking industry. 
 
Using all the banks and over the full sample period 1986-2012, we could not find a stable long-term 
relationship between the changes of net interest margins and the changes of fee income. This result 
shows that the increase in fee income of US banks is likely due to the changing nature of the banking 
industry, rather than to offset the reduction of net interest margins. However, when we look at the 
sample of large banks over the period 2000-2012, we find a stable long-term relationship between the 
changes of net interest margins and the changes of fee income. This result shows that large banks 
generate more fee income to offset the decrease of net interest margins over this period. 
 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: Section 2 gives a general introduction of ROM and TOM. 
Section 3 presents the sample and reports some descriptive statistics. Section 4 explains our empirical 
method. Section 5 presents the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 The Tendency under Transformation  
 
Ho and Saunders (1981) develop a model in which banks are seen as risk adverse dealers in deposits 
and loans. The model shows that the bank needs a positive interest spread or fee income as the 
compensation for providing immediacy of service in the face of uncertainty. It also indicates that the 
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optimal mark-up for deposit and loan services are affected by (i) the level of risk aversion of the bank, 
(ii) the economic structure, (iii) the transaction size, and (iv) the volatility of interest rate. 
 
Subsequent researchers develop new ideas based on Ho and Saunders’ model. One idea is as follows. 
Competition causes a decline in the net interest margins, and banks in turn generate more fee income 
in order to offset the margin decline. As Allen and Santomero (2001) point out, banks that rely on 
margin income are more likely to fail when margin declines. Such banks are forced to expand their 
business scopes in order to survive. Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) argue that, with the changing 
market structures and the technology improvement in 1980s, competition has become more and more 
severe in the banking industry. As a result, net interest margins are reduced and banks are forced to 
diversify their sources of revenue. Lepetit et al. (2008) report empirical evidence consistent with this 
idea. 
 
All these authors hold the opinion that with the declining deposit and loan activities during these 
years, banks passively shift their focus from borrowing and lending businesses to activities that 
generate fee income, and the importance of relationship oriented model (ROM) has been replaced by 
transaction oriented model (TOM). 
 
2.2 Views towards ROM and TOM 
 
Some people argue that banks’ rising fee income is a result of their transformation from ROM to 
TOM. As Ewijk and Arnold (2013) point out: “The phenomena are often explained using causality 
that runs from increased competition in traditional segments to lower margins to new activities.” Yet, 
some people have different views. 
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Boot and Thakor (2000) ask the following question, can relationship banking survive competition? 
They show that (1) there is more transaction lending at lower levels of interbank competition than at 
higher levels, and (2) increased interbank competition causes an increase in relationship lending, but 
each loan will have less marginal value for lenders. They conclude that in the market where banks are 
competitive, transaction oriented businesses will occur less while relationship oriented businesses 
will occur more. 
 
Elsas (2005) finds that in highly concentrated markets, the likelihood of relationship lending 
increases as concentration increases, consistent with the idea that monopoly power can foster the 
establishment of lending relationships. This finding supports the idea of Boot and Thakor (2000). 
 
Regarding the problem whether interbank competition and relationship banking are inimical or not, 
Degryse and Ongena (2007) find that banks that face more competitions are more likely to engage in 
traditional relationship-based lending. They also find that competition and relationships are not 
necessarily inimical. 
 
Rogers and Sinkey (1999) examine the features of banks that heavily relied on non-traditional 
businesses. They conclude that, due to shrinking margins from traditional businesses, which results 
from fewer core deposits and more challenging interest rate conditions, banks needs to find new ways 
to generate revenue and compete in the financial markets. 
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All these new ideas are centered on one question: which business model is more suitable for banks 
when they face changing market structure and technology enhancement, ROM or TOM? 
 
2.3 Large Banks and Small Banks in Structural Transformation 
 
When large banks face the problem of decreasing margins and the difficulty of attracting new 
customers, they tend to engage more in TOM. This is because large banks are more competitive in 
attracting investment funds and in using technologies, and they can make up the loss resulting from 
low margins by generating more fee income. Huang and Ratnovski (2011) point out that large banks 
could take valuable investment opportunities regardless of the total amount of the local deposit 
supply and could refinance unexpected retail withdrawals (also see Goodfriend and King, 1998). 
Although stepping into TOM means to move into a world where competition is even fiercer and the 
net interest margins could be even lower, large banks have the capacity to generate higher return on 
equity (ROE) compared with small banks (Ewijk and Arnold, 2013; DeYoung et al., 2004; DeYoung 
and Rice, 2004b). 
 
In contrast, small banks cannot compete with large banks in TOM. Nevertheless, they are naturally 
linked with ROM because of their customer-oriented nature. The essence of relationship lending is 
based on information, and small banks have some advantages of acquiring information. For example: 
 
(1) Small banks have sound loan portfolios. They enjoy relative high reputation and customers’ 
loyalty in the local community. The source of customers in small banks is stable. Most of the clients 
in small banks are local residents and give great preferences and trust to the local banks.  As a result, 
the loan portfolios of small banks are less risky than the loan portfolios of large banks. Large banks 
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have a variety of funding sources and complicated business operations with other financial 
institutions which make their portfolios risky. 
 
(2) Small banks provide outstanding and specific personalized services. They offer more 
personalized service and excellent customer service and give clients more personal attention. That 
leads to relatively high staff costs, which are not likely to be cut down in the future, to guarantee 
high-quality service especially in non-traditional service areas.  
 
The picture below shows the survey result that both customers and non-customers give higher 
satisfaction towards the customer service of small banks (including regional and non-traditional 
banks) than large banks. 
Figure 1: Satisfaction from customers of small and large banks 
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Berger and Udell (2002) argue that information about transactions-based lending technologies is easy 
to observe, verify and transmitted. Relationship lending, in contrast, allows small businesses without 
strong financial ratios, collateral, or credit scores to obtain bank financing, because small banks rely 
more on soft information and less on hard information.  
 
The existing papers discussing net interest margins and fee income give us detailed information about 
how people think about ROM and TOM in these years. In early years, researchers think that, because 
of the declining margins, banks pay more attention on transaction-oriented activities. More recently, 
researchers think that small and large banks may have different competitive advantages in generating 
fee income and net interest margins. 
 
2.4 The Relationship between Capital Requirements and Fee Income 
 
During 1986-2012, with the establishments of Basel I and Basel II, the capital requirement has 
become an important factor to maintain the liquidity of a bank and reduce the operating risks. It could 
be a possible reason to affect banking performance on the weights of traditional and non-traditional 
businesses.  Eyssell and Arshadi (1990) find that in 1986 and 1987, assets in large banks cannot meet 
the requirement of Basel I. But small and medium sized banks could reach the minimum required 
ratio. Thus, in order to meet the minimum requirement, one of the solutions for banks is to change 
their capital structure. 
 
Jones (2000) in his paper propose the idea that banks could decrease denominators in the capital 
ratios so as to reach the required amount. For example, off-balance sheet activities, like securitization 
and credit derivatives, provide a chance for banks to avoid the requirement and reduce the regulatory 
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risks. And eventually, they move away the risks from the balance sheet. By the way, Jones also point 
out that this method becomes widely used, especially by large banks. 
 
Besides, Van den Heuvel (2007) develops a complicated model to demonstrate that banks, whether 
they have good liquidity conditions or not, will reduce lending to maintain the minimum capital 
requirement. This strategy may be used to prevent falling below the capital requirements in the future. 
The study proves that banks may put more efforts on non-traditional activities to avoid not meeting 
the capital requirements. 
 
 In the Juliusz Jablecki’s paper (2009),  they mention the novelty of Basel II—banks’  capital  
requirements  are  decided  on  the  estimates  of  the probabilities of default (PDs) and losses given 
default (LGDs) of their loans. In this case, when the economic situation declines, PDs and LGDs will 
rise. The capital requirements will increase accordingly. In the end, banks are likely to reduce lending 
activities.  
 
 
2.5 The Work of William and Rajaguru (2013) 
In regards to the relationship between net interest margins and fee income, William and Rajaguru 
(2013) argue that the increase in fee income is not only due to the decrease in net interest margins but 
also due to the change of banking business models. 
 
Our paper follows the analysis of William and Rajaguru (2013). We want to find out the relationship 
between net interest margins and fee incomes among US commercial banks. Moreover, we wish to 
investigate the difference between small and large banks. If we could not find any relationship 
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between the changes in net interest margins and the changes of fee income, the results suggest that 
the rising fee income is a result of the changing business model from ROM to TOM. If we can find a 
significant relationship, we may conclude that banks are generating more fee income in order to 
offset the decrease in net interest margins. 
 
3. Data 
 
We obtain all the data from the WRDS database. The sample period is from 1986 to 2012, and there 
are 3,252 bank-year observations. We divide banks into two categories, small and large banks, 
according to a bank’s total assets in 1986. A large bank has total assets of $10 billion or more, and a 
small bank has total assets less than $10 billion. Except for the main difference in size, large banks 
usually have more functionalities than small banks, especially in activities that generate fee income. 
 
Table 1 reports the composition of our sample.  Small banks account for 57.32% of total number of 
observations, which weights a bit more than large banks. Thus the influence of small banks will be 
more obvious in the whole sample period.  
 
Table 2 to 4 report the descriptive statistics for all banks, large banks, and small banks, respectively.  
Following William and Rajaguru (2013), margins will be measured by [(interest income – interest 
expense) / total assets], expressed as a percentage, and fees will be measured by (non-interest income 
/ total assets), expressed as a percentage. Figure 2 to 4 present the changes of the margins and fees 
over time for all banks, large banks, and small banks, respectively. 
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Table 1: Sample Composition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
all banks large banks small banks
All years 3252 1388 1864
1986 254 52 202
1987 244 54 190
1988 233 50 183
1989 231 58 173
1990 222 65 157
1991 207 59 148
1992 188 59 129
1993 174 64 110
1994 156 65 91
1995 146 65 81
1996 132 63 69
1997 113 61 52
1998 93 56 37
1999 87 53 34
2000 81 53 28
2001 73 50 23
2002 72 52 20
2003 68 49 19
2004 61 45 16
2005 58 45 13
2006 57 43 14
2007 54 40 14
2008 52 39 13
2009 51 38 13
2010 49 37 12
2011 48 36 12
2012 48 37 11
- 12 - 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for All banks 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Large banks 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Small banks 
 
small banks
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum Number of 
deviation observations
Net interest margin 3.661484 0.855361 0.608015 25.08268 1783
/total assets (%)
Non-interest income 1.426687 2.630847 0.012952 106.7392 1783
to total assets (%)
Total assets (thousands) 4.18E+06 2.49E+06 131533 9.99E+06 1783
Interest income (thousands) 305040.9 179644.2 8919 1.15E+06 1783
1989
Net interest margin 3.561137 0.585674 2.156919 7.02318 157
/total assets (%)
Non-interest income 1.298128 0.854252 0.300092 7.66463 157
to total assets (%)
Total assets (thousands) 3.43E+06 2.10E+06 406337 9.98E+06 157
Interest income (thousands) 310977.2 185473.6 64977 9.59E+05 157
1999
Net interest margin 3.857661 0.694156 2.37082 6.061039 33
/total assets (%)
Non-interest income 1.390482 0.53246 0.524765 2.887331 33
to total assets (%)
Total assets (thousands) 5.87E+06 2.11E+06 549784 9.72E+06 33
Interest income (thousands) 397186 159238.7 35666 8.26E+05 33
2006
Net interest margin 2.980984 0.550792 1.754611 3.799013 12
/total assets (%)
Non-interest income 1.545443 0.550338 0.779683 2.86614 12
to total assets (%)
Total assets (thousands) 6.72E+06 1.84E+06 3807143 8.92E+06 12
Interest income (thousands) 369623.5 1.01E+05 208994 4.83E+05 12
2009
Net interest margin 3.173309 0.76218 1.995834 4.469097 9
/total assets (%)
Non-interest income 1.590353 0.424376 0.876091 2.277368 9
to total assets (%)
Total assets (thousands) 6.76E+06 2.17E+06 3777368 9.53E+06 9
Interest income (thousands) 303419.6 1.06E+05 166193 4.42E+05 9
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Figure 2: Average margins and fees for all banks 
 
 
Figure 3: Average margins and fees for large banks 
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Figure 4: Average margins and fees for small banks 
 
 
From the above figures we can see that for large banks, the margins fall from 1993, which is four 
years early than small banks. The margins of both small and banks have been decreasing all the way 
to 2008, which is the worst time of the financial crisis. After 2008, margins of both small and large 
banks show a trend of wave until 2012. 
 
The fee income in large banks shows a steady increase from 1986 to 1999. After that, it shows an 
unstable trend. For small banks, there is nearly no changes through the whole sample period, except 
1990, which is likely caused by the expansion of the FDIC insurance in 1989. 
 
We find that the margin of small banks is higher than that of large banks, about 3.5% to 3%. However, 
large banks have a much higher fee income, ranging from 1.5% to 2.5%. For small banks, the fee 
income is always moving around 1.3%. 
 
4. Method 
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This paper uses the panel Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model to study the time series relationship 
between Margins and Fees. Following Williams and Rajaguru (2013), the multivariate VAR(1) 
model with fixed effects take the form: 
 
[
         
      
]=[
      
      
] [
           
        
]+[

   

   
]+[
      

     
]                                      (1) 
 
Where  
   
 is a bank-fixed effect and        is a multivariate normally distributed random disturbance.  
The fixed effect can produce some bias in the estimation. Consequently, we take first difference on 
both sides of equation (1) to remove bank-fixed effect: 
 
[
          
       
]=[
      
      
] [
            
         
]+[
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]                                           (2) 
 
Because the transformed lagged endogenous variables and the transformed error terms in equation (2) 
may be correlated, we follow Williams and Rajaguru (2013) and estimate equation (2) using the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Specifically, we use the xtabond2 function in STATA to 
estimate equation (2). 
 
5. Estimation and results 
 
We divide the whole sample into two sub-periods: 1986-1999 and 2000-2012. We use year 1999 to 
divide the period because the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was enacted in that year. After the passage of 
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this Act, US banks have more flexibility to operate various banking businesses, which may contribute 
to different performance of margins and fees in the two sub-periods.  
 
Table 5 to 7 report the estimation results. P-value indicates the level of significance. For each 
coefficient, the null hypothesis is that the value is equal to zero. Hence a small p-value means that we 
can reject the null hypothesis. 
 
Table 5: Estimations for Large Banks 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
  
Large banks Whole period Sub-period 1 Sub-period 2 
 1986-2012 1986-1999 2000-2012 
VARIABLES delta_margins delta_fees delta_margins delta_fees delta_margins delta_fees 
        
delta_margins_lagged -0.225*** -0.074** -0.101** 0.027 -0.311*** -0.141*** 
 (0.055) (0.038) (0.044) (0.043) (0.059) (0.052) 
       
delta_fees_lagged -0.013 -0.163*** -0.020 -0.290*** -0.021 -0.128** 
 (0.024) (0.055) (0.045) (0.066) (0.030) (0.059) 
       
Constant -0.029*** 0.026*** 0.002 0.080*** -0.082*** -0.019 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) 
       
Observations 1,266 1,266 650 650 616 616 
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Table 6: Estimations for Small Banks 
 
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Small banks Whole period Sub-period 1 Sub-period 2 
 1986-2012 1986-1999 2000-2012 
VARIABLES delta_margins delta_fees delta_margins delta_fees delta_margins delta_fees 
       
delta_margins_lagged -0.371*** -0.693 -0.413*** -0.802 -0.166 -0.082** 
 (0.106) (0.553) (0.109) (0.643) (0.121) (0.036) 
       
delta_fees_lagged 0.006 -0.465*** 0.008* -0.461*** -0.128 -0.244*** 
 (0.005) (0.021) (0.005) (0.024) (0.092) (0.059) 
       
Constant 0.052** 0.085*** 0.078*** 0.106** -0.068*** 0.035*** 
 (0.020) (0.026) (0.024) (0.042) (0.015) (0.011) 
       
Observations 1,364 1,364 1,147 1,147 217 217 
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Table 7: Estimations for All Banks 
 
All banks Whole period Sub-period 1 Sub-period 2 
 1986-2012 1986-1999 2000-2012 
VARIABLES delta_margins delta_fees delta_margins delta_fees delta_margins delta_fees 
       
delta_margins_lagged -0.313*** -0.438 -0.349*** -0.644 -0.280*** -0.130*** 
 
(0.077) (0.352) (0.103) (0.522) (0.062) (0.041) 
       
delta_fees_lagged 0.004 -.473*** 0.005 -.467*** -0.029 -0.139** 
 
(0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.019) (0.028) (0.055) 
       
Constant 0.009 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.099*** -0.078*** -0.007 
 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.015) (0.025) (0.009) (0.010) 
       
Observations 2,630 2,630 1,797 1,797 833 833 
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 reports the estimation results for large banks. Overall the whole period as well as the two 
sub-periods, we find that the changes of fees in the previous year have no significant impact on the 
changes of margins in the following year. A possible explanation is as follows. For large banks, their 
fee income is not only generated by card income and service charges but also by investment and 
brokerage services, investment banking income, trading account profits, and so on. The change in 
previous card income and service charges may have significant impact on the following year’s 
margin, because these charges are based on traditional banking business. However, other sources of 
fee income listed above have little relationship with the traditional activities (i.e., taking deposits, 
providing loans), and such sources of fee income account for a considerably portion of the total fee 
income at large banks. 
 
However, there is a significant relationship between the changes of margins in the previous year and 
the changes of fees in the following year. The coefficient is -0.074, which means that if the changes 
of margins in the previous year are negative, then the changes of fees will be positive and vice versa. 
It could be explained that if the traditional businesses did not perform well in the previous year, then 
in the following year large banks will make up by making more money from fee income. Therefore, 
fee income is used by large banks to offset the decrease in net interest margins. 
 
Looking at the two sub-periods, we find that the result in the second sub-period is consistent with the 
whole sample period, while the relationship is insignificant in the first sub-period. This is probably 
due to the Glass-Stegall Act before 1999 so that there are separations between investment banks and 
depository banks. The separations are repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999. After that year 
large banks are better able to generate fee income in order to offset any decline in net interest margins, 
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and the relationship the changes of margins in the previous year and the changes of fees in the 
following year becomes significant. 
 
Table 6 reports the estimation results for small banks. For the whole period, the changes of margins 
are not affected by the changes of fees in the previous year. In the first sub-period, changes of 
margins have a negative relation with the lagged changes of fees. However, the coefficient, 0.008, is 
very small, which suggests that the influence is not very significant. In the second sub-period, the 
relationship between the two variables is not significant. We conclude that the changes of margins are 
not significantly affected by the changes of fees in the previous year. 
 
To understand the reason behind our result, we note that the net interest margin is a function of 
capital structure, economic growth, inflation, interest level, interest risk, credit risk, operational costs 
and some other factors (van Ewijk and Arnold, 2013). Small banks have limited business scale, and 
usually do not have the capability to generate significant fee income. When the monetary policy of 
the Federal Reserve or the whole economic situation changes, the influence of macro economy is 
more powerful than that of the banks’ own intention. 
 
The graph below presents two major macro factors that affect the net interest margins of banks: the 
interest rate levels and the interest rate volatilities. As we can observe, the benchmark interest rate in 
the US during 1986-2012 has changed frequently. The interest rates of small banks, as a result, need 
to follow the base interest rate to reflect the market trend, which influences their margins accordingly. 
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Table 8: Interest Rate in US 
 
 
The other two variables, changes of fees and changes of margins lagged, have a different relationship 
over different sample periods. For the whole period, the changes of fees are not affected by the 
changes of margins in the previous year. This result also holds for the first sub-period. Because small 
banks have limited service scale, they find it difficult to generate more fee income. The strategy of 
using traditional banking services to involve more participation in non-traditional banking services 
seems to be inefficient. 
 
An interesting result in the second sub-peirod is that changes of fees have a negative response to the 
changes of margins lagged, suggesting that a decrease in net interest margin in the previous year is 
followed by an increae in fee income in the following year. This is prabably due to the Gramm–
Leach–Bliley Act (GLB), also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999. It 
repealed part of the Glass–Steagall Act of 1933, removing barriers in the market among banking 
companies, securities companies and insurance companies that prohibited any one institution from 
acting as any combination of an investment bank, a commercial bank, and an insurance company. It 
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was a good news for all the banks in the US. They had more space and flexibility to provide non-
traditional business services which could improve their fee income. If a bank’s net interest margin 
declines in one year due to economic conditions or competition, the bank can put more effort on its 
special non-traditional services to generate more fee income. 
 
Table 7 reports the estimation results for all the banks. We find that the results for all banks are 
basically consistent with the results for large and small banks, especially with small banks. In 
particular, the changes of fees in the previous year have no influence on changes of margins. This is 
perhaps because of the following reason. On the one hand, margins are mainly affected by the levels 
and volatilities of interest rate, which are determined by the Federal Reserve and the macro economic 
conditions. So the impact of changes in fee here is little compared to the interest rates influenced by 
overall economy. On the other hand, a large portion of fee income is not from the traditional business 
services, but from services such as investment advice. So contribution to margins by traditional 
customer services is limited. 
 
In regards to the relationship between the changes of margins in the previous year and the changes of 
fees in the following year, the results are different due to the bank size. Large banks show significant 
negative relationship between these two variables, while small banks show no such relationship. The 
relationship for the whole sample over the whole period is not significant. That is because there are 
more small banks in our sample. 
 
Overall, the development of fee income is a passive changing process, which is affected by the 
changes in the traditional businesses. Before 1999, the non-significant relationship between changes 
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of margins in the previous year and changes of fees does not mean there is a change in the nature of 
the financial intermediation. During that period, policy controlled the economy and it is hard for 
banks to generate more fee income. After 1999, there is a strong relationship in large banks, 
compared with small banks. 
 
6. Conclusion and further studies 
 
This paper examines the relationship between fee income and net interest margins of US banks over 
the period 1986-2012. The GMM method is used in estimating the two variables for all banks, large 
banks and small banks separately with two sub-periods: 1986-1999 and 2000-2012. It is found that 
for large banks, in 1986-2012, changes of fees have a negative relationship with the changes of 
margins in the previous year. However, over the first sub-period, no such relationship exists. We 
argue that, after 1999, large banks are better able to offset a declining net interest margins by 
generating more fee income. Before 1999, business lines of banks are limited in many aspects, and 
fee income accounts for a small portion of a bank’s total revenue. Thus, it is not easy for a bank to 
increase its fee income.  
 
For small banks, the results are similar except that in the whole period there is no significant 
relationship between the changes of margins and the changes of fees. For all banks, the two variables 
have no significant relationships in the whole period. In the second sub-period, the relationship is 
significant. We believe this is due to the fact that there are more small banks in our sample. 
 
Table 9 below summarizes our estimation results. 
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Table 9: Summary of results 
 
  All banks Large banks Small banks 
  ∆margins ∆fees ∆margins ∆fees ∆margins ∆fees 
        
1986-
2012 
∆margins 
lagged 
 0  1  0 
∆fees lagged 0  0  0  
        
1986-
1999 
∆margins 
lagged 
 0  0  0 
∆fees lagged 0  0  1  
        
2000-
2012 
∆margins 
lagged 
 1  1  1 
∆fees lagged 0  0  0  
 
Note: In each cell, a value of 0 means the coefficient is not statistically significant, and a value of 1 
means that the coefficient is statistically significant 
 
A bank’s net interest margins and fee income are two important factors in the contemporary banking 
industry. Nowadays, the competition in banking industry is so strong that banks, no matter large or 
small, have to devote efforts to develop new business and attract more clients. After the recent 
financial crisis, the Fed is very sensitive to interest rate control and banking regulation, which will 
put some limits on the existing bank business. It is important for a bank to observe and estimate the 
fluctuation of market interest rates and regulatory policy of the Fed. 
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